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INEQUALITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
[Forthcoming in Michigan Law Review, book review issue]
Saul Levmore*
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. By Thomas Piketty. Translated by Arthur
Goldhammer. Cambridge and London: Belknap/Harvard University Press. 2014. Pp. viii,
696. $39.95.
Introduction
Rising inequality in the developed world, especially in the shadow of the Great
Recession in the United States, has made the topic a hot one. Social movements (“We are
the 99%!”), university courses, documentary films, and best-selling books have
capitalized on—and contributed to—the heat. Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the TwentyFirst Century, the most significant and probably best-received of these books, is
provocative, data-driven, very French, pessimistic, widely-reviewed, admirable, and
maddening. In contrast to many other works on inequality, it is organized around a single
idea. The thesis predicts growing inequality of wealth in the absence of external shocks
or interventionist policies. It is set forth in lucid fashion and then surrounded by a great
deal of evidence from around the world, from the late-1700’s to the present. The data,
including available technical appendices, provide context and confirmation. This is a
serious book. In its final chapters, it turns to its eponymous time period and suggests a
global wealth tax and other means of reversing the present course. Here, it is more
speculative than empirical. Unsurprisingly, these prescriptions have garnered a large
fraction of the attention paid to this book, although Piketty’s data choices have hardly
gone uncriticized–or undefended.1 Data collection and analysis have been Piketty’s
impressive stock-in-trade for many years, but it is his central thesis and normative
prescription that occupy this Review.
* William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful
for comments received from Brian Hanessian and Martha Nussbaum.
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Part I sets out the book’s central thesis. Whether or not completely correct, it may
well emerge as one of the great ideas of social science. This is not just another book
about inequality, economic history, or the relationship between labor and capital in
production functions, although these subjects do find their way into the book. Piketty
presents a big idea. It may not be quite as jolting as comparative advantage or deadweight
loss or rational expectations, to name a few of economics’ truly lasting ideas from several
centuries, but it comes close. The number of copies sold and number of professional
reviews suggest that professional and lay readers alike recognize the remarkable potential
of this idea. Part I, therefore, attempts to introduce the thesis in plain terms and to show
its counterintuitive qualities. Part II widens the picture with some discussion of
alternative explanations of some of the data, as well as selected objections to the logic
advanced in the book. Part III turns to assets that are excluded from Piketty’s
calculations. Part IV then explores the book’s suggestion about wealth taxation and other
means of offsetting the march to destabilizing inequality. The discussion uses the
occasion of Piketty’s great splash to introduce the idea that optimal fiscal policy needs to
include considerations of political decision-making, or public choice. Concerns about
inequality might provide the impetus necessary to make us rethink the way we tax and
spend.
I. The Basic Thesis: r > g
The central idea begins with the observation or intuition that the rate of return
available to a passive investor generally exceeds the rate of growth in income available to
most people in an economy (pp. 25, 571). One who sits back with inherited wealth,
reasonably well-invested, will have an increasingly large claim on resources compared to
the hard-working laborer across town who relies on earned income. Over time, the gap
between the two will grow and, on a larger scale, wealth (as well as income) inequality in
the economy will increase. For a variety of technical reasons, Piketty normally states this
thesis—or trend—in terms of the inequality, r > g, where r is the rate of return on capital,
and g is the growth rate of the economy. Readers who have shielded themselves from
this claim or who are meeting it (or large parts of economics) for the first time, would do
well to think about r > g before proceeding.
Some simple observations about r and g may be useful. An individual can flourish
economically and increase her earnings faster than the economy grows, but all
individuals cannot. There are different ways we could measure national income, but the
notion is that average (and aggregate) individual income is tied to national income. This
growth in income, g, might depend on population, immigration, and technological
change, but it is observable, and Piketty will rely not on theories about g but on
observations over time.
It is easy to observe one’s own savings stagnate in an era of low interest rates
while getting raises at work, and imagine that g must exceed r, and perhaps by a fair
amount. This was especially so when many families’ savings took the form of equity in
housing, and that asset class, declined in value. At the same time, when the rate of return
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from invested savings, or capital, is high, it is often so because the investor had some
tolerance for risk. When people imagine what their world would be like if they had
bought Google stock when it was first available, or when they observe peers in Silicon
Valley becoming wealthy through stock options, they are not really accumulating
evidence of high r but rather of returns to risk. Myopia is similarly apparent in assessing
g. An individual might experience low g, but the population (and even the working-age
population) might be increasing, so that per-capita g is low but g is relatively high.
Piketty is terrific at helping the reader comprehend these things. One feels in
especially safe hands when it comes to the author’s specialties: acquiring and explaining
available data sets, and analyzing evidence about national income accounts, and the
return on capital, including profits, dividends, rents, and interest. The more one reads
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the more one will become convinced that over the
long run—and in many places—r is indeed normally greater than g. If it helps to have
actual numbers in mind, then it might be useful to think of the long run return on capital,
r, as 3 or 4% (pp. 208, 358, 361), and the long run growth in income, g, as 1.5% (pp. 73,
93). Higher growth rates are often associated with developing economies, technological
advances, and sudden improvements in infrastructure. Once economies mature, however,
we can expect some convergence in g, if not in r as well (pp. 69-71). Almost amusingly,
Piketty is quick to assure us that even a g of 1% is formidable when compounded over
many years (pp. 95-96). Fifty years of that kind of g yields a complete change in lifestyle.
It goes without saying, though it is never quite said, that half a century of sitting back and
earning 4% on one’s inheritance would produce yet more dramatic material changes.
It bears emphasis that it is the long run that counts. The book, and perhaps all
serious discussion of inequality, is about the long run. If we see hedge fund managers
making a great deal of money for several years, while school teachers are experiencing
stagnant pay, we might have reason for concern, and we can expect passionate discussion
of such things as comparable worth and whether markets really work. But seasoned
observers know that industries and incomes rise and fall. The starting salaries at large law
firms grew about 5% a year for nearly two decades until 2008.2 No insular law student
would have believed that g was really 1 or 2%. But the cost, and even the net cost, of law
school was also skyrocketing, the stock market and inflation had their own histories over
the same period, and the prospects of law school graduates fell quickly after 2008. At
various points during those heady years, one might have made all sorts of claims about
growing or shrinking inequality. But inequality is a macro-economic topic, calling for
data over a long period from many or all industries. Even thirty-year snapshots are
entirely inadequate, especially so when the researcher can pick and choose among
periods. Piketty might lead us astray with this tactic here and there,3 but where the allimportant g and r are concerned, his data go back as far as good data are available, and
2
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the reader is treated to discussions of income, capital stocks, and inequality trends over
generations and even centuries, and across many countries. If r exceeds g, then those who
inherit wealth will outperform, if that is the word, those who work, and who live off
earned income rather than income from capital. Over time, inequality will become more
dramatic. The haves will thrive while the have-nots will need to hustle to get a share of
the mere 1 or 1.5%. To be sure, r is not always greater than g, and there can be reversals.
If it were not so, Piketty’s inequality would be obvious. The data reveal that 1914-1945
was an unusual period (pp. 274-278, 284, 293-94). The World Wars and the Depression
were trend-busters. They altered the value of assets and ownership structures; they caused
population shifts; and, perhaps as important, they facilitated dramatic changes in tax rates
and social welfare policies. In many ways, Piketty’s insight is to show that the inequality
trends of the last couple of decades are of a piece with hundreds of years of economic
history.
Is there a problem? If r > g were embedded in a larger pattern in which g was
relatively impressive—or even perhaps where g increased with the inequality—then for
many observers there would be no problem to solve. Inequality for most people is a way
of thinking about the well-being of those at the bottom of the income distribution.4 If
their lot is improving rapidly, few begrudge the wealth at the top, and that would
probably be so even if the growth at the top were yet faster than that at the bottom. For
example, if supermanagers, as Piketty calls them (p. 265), in the United States made
increasingly large amounts of money compared to rank-and-file workers, but American
companies regularly outperformed their foreign competitors, so that even the lowliest
workers received a piece of a rapidly growing pie, then inequality might be accepted as
the price of a higher standard of living for all. The American story would be one of
incentives to encourage the best managers. Similarly, if American exceptionalism
included not only more dramatic inequality than is found in Europe and Japan, but also
significantly more rapid technological improvements, then we might insist that greater
returns to innovators sparked economic growth. Piketty’s evidence blocks this escape. To
be sure, the future might prove him wrong, and the great stagnation of the last several
years helps Piketty’s claim, but the point is that we now have a theory, built on r > g, that
makes the optimistic story about rewards to innovators and managers less plausible.
There have been periods when higher executive salaries in the United States could be
associated with better stock market performance, but such optimism about the American
Way is sensitive to the time periods chosen for inspection. Over the long haul, we can see
that mature economies settle into similar growth rates. Just as the recent superb
performance of the Chinese economy does not prove that China’s political or economic
structures are superior to those found in Western capitalist states, so too some periods of
American out-performance should not convince us that a high ratio of executive-toworker salaries produces magic.
4
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But even if inequality does not promote economic growth for the general good,
what problem does it represent? Increasing inequality is, of course, what r > g promises,
so the question has special bite. Is increasing inequality unseemly, immoral, or
destabilizing? The latter seems likely only if there is no improvement in the standard of
living for the masses. Piketty does not dwell on this question of the precise problem with
inequality, and that may be because it is a question that seems unrelated to his expertise
in economics. But when he discusses the importance of public investment in education,5
he seems to be proceeding as if the obvious lesson of stubborn or even increasing
inequality is that it must reflect inequality of opportunity. It is likely that for many
citizens this is an important feature of inequality. Inequality, and growing inequality,
startles us because we like to think that the American dream is a reality for many. If it is
not, then we see inequality as likely reflecting unequal opportunities, and that strikes us
as inefficient and wrong. Note, however, that this sort of thinking about inequality is not
the immediate subject of Piketty’s book. The r > g claim is that even with perfectly equal
access to good schools, good jobs, and other opportunities to develop one’s capabilities,
inequality will increase so that correctives are necessary.
If serious inequality goes uncorrected, and the society is not so affluent that even
those in the lower part of the wealth distribution can afford good health care, schools, and
enriching activities, then inequality is likely to be associated with increasingly unequal
opportunities. Citizens who do not have access to good schools or adequate health care
are obviously disadvantaged, and often tragically so, and they represent missed
opportunities for the society as a whole. Growth and well-being come not merely from
our own work but from that of others, and with rare exception we are better off when our
fellow citizens, local and global, are allowed to flourish. This is one reason to fear that
inequality slows economic growth.6 Piketty does not press this sort of claim. He assumes
that readers will find increasing inequality abhorrent, perhaps as a moral matter or as a
threat to political and social stability. To the extent that some reviewers have suggested
that more attention needs to be paid to the question of whether inequality, and even
increasing inequality, is a bad thing,7 an easy answer is that of course it is so when there
is reason to think that it reflects and brings about suboptimal opportunities for many lowincome people. In our era, grave inequality, whether in the United States, China, India, or
Britain, is associated with millions of people who cannot flourish and, without basic tools
and opportunities, cannot even contribute to the economy as the majority would wish.
The prospect of this sort of inequality worsening is horrible to contemplate from every
political angle.
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II. Doubts about the Thesis
Skeptics can resist Piketty’s data, extrapolations, omitted variables, or policy
prescriptions. Part III tangles with some important exclusions from the data, and Part IV
explores Piketty’s idea of softening inequality with a periodic wealth tax. But I turn first
to the possibility that even unimpeachable data as to r > g do not support the claim that
the inequality will continue in the future. Perhaps r has had a good run, but diminishing
returns to capital must eventually set in. On the other side of the inequality, the recent
emergence of very highly compensated professionals and entrepreneurs may be
temporary, or may reflect technological changes that will soon trickle down to the middle
and lower classes which, in turn, change in composition because of immigration. At the
same time, the fortunes created and enhanced by r may shrink because of consumption
patterns, bequests, and philanthropy, so that inequality will not grow as predicted.
A. Diminishing Returns to Capital
The stubborn character of the r > g centerpiece must puzzle students of
introductory economics as it has professional economists. If the rate of return to capital is
high, then there should be more investment in capital. Individuals can be expected to save
more and to defer consumption. Further increases in the capital stock can be anticipated if
we allow for capital mobility and foreign investment, so long as r has not already settled
into some transnational equilibrium. But as high returns attract capital, opportunities to
earn high returns ought eventually to diminish, and decreasing returns should be
expected. Moreover, if capital remains expensive, because its suppliers need to be paid
high returns, then there is room to substitute labor for capital. This demand for labor
ought to increase g. Piketty’s response to this doubt about the long-term claim regarding r
> g is essentially to report that it simply has not been so. He has examined the long term,
and r in particular has been remarkably stable.
There are reasons to be surprised about long-term stability of r. For example,
returns to land can be expected to rise as the population increases, because the supply of
land is almost fixed (landfill has done wonders in Chicago and Hong Kong, but these
were unusual and very expensive projects). If the return to land is stable, it must be
because building up reduces price pressure on land itself. Technological change has
improved yields per acre and this, along with better transportation to distant lands, must
have offset the effect of increased population on the returns to agricultural land. With
respect to other forms of capital, perhaps technological change has offset diminishing
returns.
In a theoretical vacuum, r > g might seem implausible. In turn, any prediction
about increasing inequality would be weakened by the claim that the rate of return to
capital, r, will surely fall in the future. Piketty’s book has attracted attention because it
says, essentially, that data do not lie. The evidence now amassed from the last couple of
hundred years suggests that optimists stop waiting for something that has never happened
in the absence of war or similar shocks. At every turn it is useful to remember that this is
a thesis driven by data rather than by theory. This is one reason why some of the critical
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reactions to the book focus on the data.8 Piketty, in turn, has defended and been defensive
about his methods.9 I leave that debate to economics journals and assume, if only for the
sake of argument, that a good case can be made for Piketty’s choices and interpretation.
B. Consumption, Bequests, and Philanthropy Should Dissipate Fortunes
But why would the rich want to be so rich? If the rate of return is reliably stable
over long periods with diversified investments, why do wealthy people not spend more
and then, in the aggregate, offset or even reduce the growing inequality? Piketty proceeds
with the idea that rich people reinvest more than 60% of their returns (p. 395), and this
leaves plenty of room for the wealthy to put yet more distance between themselves and
those who started behind them. However, even if wealthy people enjoy amassing fortunes
rather than spending them down, the same is unlikely to be true for their heirs, who will
need to spend a greater proportion of the capital on hand in order to maintain the
lifestyles to which they become accustomed. Fortunes are often divided through
inheritance and even a casual look at lists of the wealthiest people shows that new names
appear all the time, and old names fall off the list, often because of division through
inheritance.10
Piketty’s thesis does not require that the richest people remain on any list.
Increasing inequality is consistent with the children and grandchildren of the super-rich
falling only so far as down to the top .1% or even 1%. These wealthy people may also
“spend” money in ways that preserve capital. They may, for example, buy multiple
residences and gain utility from the ownership of these properties; the actual consumption
cost is limited to foregone rents, or earnings available from other investments they might
have made instead. More generally, many super-wealthy people behave as if money is
not a medium of exchange but rather a means of keeping score. The pleasure is in the
accumulation and, for a subset of these people, the perception by others that one’s score
is impressive or that the score signals something important.
Piketty’s argument does not require an understanding of why wealth is retained
rather than consumed. It is hard to know whether he is more offended by passive wealth
8

See, e.g., Chris Giles, Piketty Findings Undercut by Errors, FIN. TIMES (May 23, 2014),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/e1f343ca-e281-11e3-89fd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz39SQelkgz.; William
McBride, Thomas Piketty’s False Depiction of Wealth in America, August 4, 2014,
http://taxfoundation.org/article/thomas-piketty-s-false-depiction-wealth-america.
For an overview of some of the issues, see Scott Winship, Financial Times vs. Piketty on U.S.: Smoke, No
Fire, June 3, 2014http://www.economics21.org/commentary/financial-times-vs-piketty-us-smoke-no-fire;
Scott Winship, Is Wealth Inequality Rising? (On Paul Krugman’s Ambiguity Denial), June 2014,
http://www.economics21.org/commentary/wealth-inequality-rising-paul-krugmans-ambiguity-denial.
9

Thomas Piketty, Technical appendix of the book, Capital in the Twenty-first Century, Appendix to
chapter 10: Inequality of Capital Ownership, Addendum: Response to FT (May 28, 2014),
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/capital21c/en/Piketty2014TechnicalAppendixResponsetoFT.pdf
10
The point is made in many reviews, including the excellent Lawrence H. Summers, The Inequality
Puzzle, Summer 2014, http://www.democracyjournal.org/33/the-inequality-puzzle.php?page=2.
Note that inherited wealth is a large fraction of wealth but there have been periods, at least in some
countries, during which wealth was mostly earned in one’s lifetime (p. 402).

7

or by the rich getting richer, as they would if they also worked. The problem is likely
rhetorical rather than political or economic. If he holds up Bill Gates or Warren Buffet as
exemplars of the inequality problem, readers will rebel and insist that these people work
for some of their money, and that huge returns might well give them an incentive to work
more and to create wealth for others. But when he returns several times to Liliane
Bettencourt, heiress of the cosmetics company, L’Oreal, the reader begins to chuckle at
the prospect of Ms. Bettencourt’s choosing to go to work (p. 440). Had she done so with
any success, the inequality meter would have tipped yet further to the right. The book is
at its best when it clings to its central thesis; Gates and Bettencourt leave the rest of us
further and further behind because the rates of return they earn on their capital exceed the
increases in income earned by the rest of the pack.
Gates and Buffet have, famously, done much more than consume or count points;
they have spearheaded a remarkable initiative by beginning to give away more than half
their fortunes and encouraging other billionaires to do the same.11 Their behavior is not
unusual in the United States, which has a long history of great philanthropy.12 Many
donors work hard to avoid taxes and to accumulate wealth, and then they turn around and
give most of it away–often (but obviously not always) to causes the government would
have funded with additional tax revenues. They are like the customer who negotiates the
price of a trip to the airport, and then arrives at the destination and tips the driver more
than the amount saved by hard bargaining.
Private philanthropy, and the tax deduction for charitable giving, may be socially
efficient if it outsources the identification and monitoring of recipients to persons with
better information than the government possesses.13 It is even possible that this
delegation of decision-making to a small number of wealthy people and foundations
overcomes collective action and interest group problems. The topic is of little interest to
Piketty, perhaps because private philanthropy is much less important in Europe, and even
less important in Asia. American economists, and certainly law-and-economics scholars,
are far more likely to think of philanthropy as enabling (healthy) private-public
competition in such things as education, and especially higher education, and health care.
Private philanthropists have influence on the institutions they support, and some
of it is probably good. Universities must answer to their donors and try to show that
marginal contributions really make a difference. Large-scale philanthropists may well
determine the priorities of some universities. Academics are likely to find this appalling,
11
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but the real question is how this compares to systems in which government bureaucrats
make all the decisions.
Finally, for many donors, philanthropy may be a kind of consumption activity.
For some, philanthropy is a positional good, and they compete with one another to be
more generous, to associate their names with good causes, and to gain access to
celebrities. Even the most consumptive philanthropy often produces benefits for others.
Most low-income citizens would prefer that the wealthy try to outdo one another with
philanthropic endeavors than that they compete with lavish yachts.
In the United States, philanthropic transfers are of the same order of magnitude as
the amount that Piketty would extract through a progressive wealth tax, discussed in Part
IV below,14 and so it might seem as if philanthropy can undo a good deal of inequality.
But any claim of equivalence, or substitutability, between a plausible wealth tax and
voluntary philanthropy is speculative and approximate. For one thing, government
spending and then redistribution (of the putative wealth tax) might or might not be more
progressive than this philanthropy. Charitable gifts to churches, like gifts to wellendowed universities, will strike some readers as excellent alternatives to government
spending and as the best means of creating an equal opportunity society. More skeptical
readers will deride such gifts, especially if the donor is a member of the church or an
alumnus of the university receiving the gift, for these can seem like transfers to one’s
own clubs. But even if we think of all philanthropy as socially desirable or as
redistributive as government programs would be, it is hard to know whether a wealth tax
would displace private philanthropy. It is possible that philanthropy in the United States
is much more significant than it is in Europe because higher taxes and greater social
welfare programs encourage wealthy Europeans to think that they have done their part
through taxation. There are other explanations for the philanthropy gap between the
United States and Europe (and Japan). Tax laws play a role; a significant fraction of
philanthropy is to or through churches, which have thrived in the United States and
declined in Europe; and American entrepreneurial traditions may simply carry over to
philanthropy. Note that even if wealthy people are less inclined to be charitable when
they perceive that higher taxes are doing the work, the higher tax rates might also induce
more charitable giving than would otherwise be the case, in either Europe or the United
States, because the conventional tax deduction is a more potent incentive in higher
income tax brackets.
In any event, it is plain that even in the United States philanthropy does not undo
inequality. For one thing, lower income people also give away significant amounts, in
part because of the relative importance of religious organizations. More important, total
14
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giving by the top decile or one percent is a large amount, but not nearly enough to offset
the increasing share of income that has gone to these groups in recent years. We return, as
always, to r and g. Over the long haul r is much greater than g; even after the owners of
capital consume more, bequest more, and give away more, they are left with returns that
exceed g.
C. High Earners as a Temporary Phenomenon
Technological change in the last several decades has helped generate great wealth
for a few people and very substantial incomes for a subset of professionals, but economic
growth and the standard of living for the vast majority of Americans have not enjoyed
similar advances.15 Piketty’s readers are encouraged to see American stagnation as part of
the long run story of r > g. Viewed from Europe, the United States looks like a greedy
place where the rich get richer, finance political candidates including themselves, resist
providing health care and other necessities to the poor, and decline to be taxed at just
rates. But when Americans look in the mirror, they continue to see the American dream.
Most ignore the fact that Bill Gates’s father was a successful lawyer, probably a member
of the 1%, and visualize instead the college dropout who became a billionaire, as did his
competitor, Steve Jobs, who started Apple in his family’s quintessentially American
garage. There are data to support the optimistic view that inequality is or can be transitory
because there is significant upward mobility even from the lowest rungs on the income
ladder.16 At the high end, the richest Americans in 2010 were not the same as the richest
in 1985, just as the Fortune 500 corporations have turned over a great deal.17 If ours were
among the most unequal societies, but today’s poor became tomorrow’s wealthy, there
would be less concern. Inequality would seem like the natural outcome of an incentivebased society, and the turnover would be taken as proof of equal opportunity. Upward
mobility has, however, probably decreased in the United States, though it remains to be
seen whether this short-term trend continues. It is especially troubling that upward
mobility is extremely low in some regions of the country.18 Nor is it clear that the
problems of the underclass have much to do with r > g. In any event, a critic might say,
if r > g is the key to understanding inequality, then should we not expect a great deal of
stability at the top?
15

Compare Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and
Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies (2014) (optimistic view of digital age) with Tyler Cowen,
The Age of Stagnation (2011) (the “low-hanging fruit” has been picked).
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Compare Raj Chetty et al., Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in
Intergenerational Mobility (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 19844, 2014)
(mobility has been fairly constant) with Katherine Bradbury, Trends in U.S. Family Income Mobility, 19692006 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 11-10, 2011) (upward mobility has decreased).
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For an in depth look at the trends among the very rich in the 1990s, see ARTHUR B. KENNICKELL, FED.
RES. BOARD, A ROLLING TIDE: CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IN THE U.S., 1989-2001, 2-4
(2003).
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One explanation for the upward and downward movement at the top is that very
high earners, like successful hedge fund managers, have made their way into the ranks of
the rich and super-rich. This might be a source of doubt about Piketty’s claim of
increasing inequality because the conditions that brought about these high earners may
not be long-lasting. These high earners come from three sources. The first is ranks of
corporate officers, where supermanagers have garnered remarkable compensation
packages. The second is the financial sector, where the pattern of compensation allows
successful managers and investors to make enormous fortunes. The third significant
source of high earners is the entertainment industry, including professional sports, where
digital media and globalization have created a superstar economy. The economic success
of such standouts as Oprah Winfrey and Michael Jordan has no counterpart in earlier
centuries.
It is difficult to know whether these industries will continue to produce high
earners. Corporate governance or markets may change; hedge funds and their
compensation packages already seem like a fad; and entertainment markets are in flux,
especially where income streams depend on intellectual property rights. But even if the
conditions bringing about these high earners change, the r > g story will remain. Episodic
high earners have more to do with the turnover at the top than with the larger issue of
inequality. Further, these high earners may also be the source of some miscalculations.
Piketty excludes human capital, partly because it is difficult to measure (p. 46). It is
tempting to object that this is like limiting one’s search for lost keys to the sidewalk
beneath the street-lamp. It is, to be sure, difficult to separate labor from capital where
compensation in the corporate and financial worlds is concerned. But there is no reason
to think that human capital is distributed in a more egalitarian fashion in the United States
than in Europe, and no reason to think that if we included human capital in the
calculations, the overall picture would be very different from that set out for us by
Piketty.
Furthermore, Piketty’s focus on highly-paid corporate officers is revealing. The
basic claim is that a fair amount of recent inequality is the product of the generous
compensation packages paid to those who run large corporations. It is well known that
these compensation packages, comprising salary as well as stock options and other
components, have risen in dramatic fashion compared to the compensation of the median
worker in these firms. Wages have stagnated while incomes at the top have skyrocketed.
Piketty, along with many economists and law professors, thinks it unlikely that such high
compensation is necessary or even closely related to corporate performance.19
Corporations are sprawling entities and it is difficult to calculate the value added by one
or a few managers (p. 331). A respectable school of thought thinks that there is a kind of
circularity at work, in which companies are pushed to raise compensation packages in
order to be competitive with other companies; no one wants to insult the CEO and imply
that he or she is sub-average. Moreover, the directors and consultants who help set the
19

See LUCIEN M. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2006).
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compensation packages are often appointed, or at least identified, by the managers whose
pay they are to determine. These directors and consultants often benefit when the
compensation packages they recommend are part of an upward spiral.
There is surely a good deal of truth in this line of argument, but it is revealing that
Piketty prefers to dwell on these highly paid CEO’s, or supermanagers, rather than on
hedge fund managers or other new entrants to the ranks of the super-rich. This may be
because he, like most economists, clings to the idea of rational actors in efficient markets.
The story about supermanagers’ excessive compensation is palatable because
shareholders are dispersed; few find it worthwhile to object to managerial compensation,
and their objections would not amount to much anyway. They can exit, or not invest in
these corporations in the first place, but it is difficult for other corporations to promise
that their compensation packages will not also spiral upward. Some managers shirk a
little, exhibiting the classic principal-agent problem, while some extract more
compensation than necessary. Economists can accept this story and even claim to have
predicted it.
In contrast, the stratospheric compensation of hedge-fund managers is more
difficult to rationalize. A typical hedge-fund investor pays an annual fee of 2% of assets
and 20% of profits earned. It is possible that in the beginning there were some gifted
managers who could find extraordinary investments, but with thousands of funds and
trillions of dollars in the industry, the reality of efficient markets prevails. The managers
earn fortunes in good years, even if it was the overall market rather than their choice of
investments that did well, and then need not rebate money in bad years, when they must
make do with the modest fortunes available from the 2% component. Nevertheless,
apparently sophisticated customers have flocked to these funds, apparently disagreeing
with Piketty’s (in my view reasonable) judgment that they earn “pay for luck” (p. 335).
Our inability to understand why so many people pay so much to money managers, or
stock brokers for that matter, may illuminate Piketty’s inclination to notice
supermanagers rather than other high-income workers in the financial sector, but it has
little bearing on the question of what these compensation packages have to do with longrun inequality. If these high-earners are not episodic, perhaps because investors will
continue to play a kind of lottery, then perhaps in each decade we will find a new group
of lucky managers. If so, there will be some turnover at the top, but not much impact on
the larger picture of inequality. A few thousand lucky superstars per decade do not
change the overall picture in a country of some 300 million people.20
D. Immigration
Piketty describes the period between 1914 and 1945–when r was abnormally low
and inequality was shrinking–as unusual because of the wars and Depression that marked
the period (pp. 274-278, 284, 293-94). An alternative view is that it was a period in which
20

It is of course possible that superstar markets will expand. Perhaps donors to universities, or organizers
of massive (and not necessarily open) online courses), will pay millions to attract the best physicists or
lecturers on Shakespeare, in which case competition among these providers will bring about a new set of
super-rich. The top .1% will turn over, but the overall share of income going to the bottom 50% will likely
stay the same.
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the New World came into its own. New countries and large-scale immigration may undo
the inexorable march toward greater inequality that r > g seems to dictate. If so, then it is
especially interesting to imagine, as Piketty briefly allows (p. 538), a world in which
workers flowed—just as easily as capital did—across borders to higher returns. At
present, virtually all countries restrict labor mobility. They do so to protect some groups
of domestic workers, ensure stability, maintain ethnic and other identities, and prevent
sharing of resources, public goods, and welfare benefits with newcomers.
Free movement across borders seems so unlikely as a political matter that I will
not dwell on it further. However, another aspect to immigration, insofar as it impacts
inequality, deserves of attention. Immigrants may forestall upward mobility out of the
bottom half of the wealth distribution in the United States either because the supply of
immigrants depresses wages, or, to the contrary, because many immigrants are skilled,
energetic, and educated, and quickly occupy the middle class.21 First- and secondgeneration Americans (and their counterparts elsewhere) may also have different
spending and saving patterns. If all these things add up as suggested, then the recent
decline in upward mobility (assuming that contested fact)—and even the increased
inequality—might not reflect any fundamental problem or presage social instability. In
any event, much more work is needed to understand the interaction between immigration
patterns and inequality.
III. Social Security and Other Public Benefits
Perhaps the most misleading aspect of Piketty’s data and lament is his treatment
of social security, which is more or less excluded from the calculations (p. 392). We are
told, for example, that 50% of Americans have, essentially, no wealth at all (p. 336). The
financial assets of this 50%, and even the lower 75%, was, of course, dramatically
worsened by the Great Recession of 2008, especially with the decline in the value of
housing. A remarkable fraction of the population emerged with negative housing assets,
as mortgage liabilities exceeded the values of their properties. Unlike their counterparts
in Japan and other countries, many of these people had no other savings. They may have
been overly optimistic about their future earnings or the value of their real estate
holdings, may have felt compelled to support extended family members, or may have
calculated that low savings would eventually bring about greater public benefits.22
Most Americans without individual retirement savings can expect to live on social
security income, and they would surely be surprised to read that they have “nothing.”
Social Security, like most public pension systems here and abroad, is not—at least
technically—a savings plan. Benefits are best understood as the product of ongoing
21

See, e.g., Magnus Lofstrom & Joseph Hayes, H-1Bs: How do They Stack Up to US Born Workers? 20-22
(Forschunginstitut zur Zunkuft der Arbeit, Working Paper No. 6259, 2011) (skilled immigrants do well).
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See Saul Levmore, From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity, Information
Revelation, and Internalities, 81 U. Chicago L. Rev. 229, 23839 (2014) (suggesting that the failure to save
may have an interest group dimension as non-savers might develop political power and induce relief).
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congressional decision-making, and money in the Social Security Trust Fund is not
earmarked in the manner of accounts in most private pension plans. On the other hand,
Social Security benefits are largely a function of earnings and therefore of the taxes one
paid into the system, although payouts do not consist of these taxes plus interest earned
on them. It is not inaccurate to describe Social Security, and most countries’ public
pension systems, as of the pay-as-you-go variety, but benefits are probably more
predictable and reliable than the returns on most private savings, and they are obviously
influenced by aggregate contributions in addition to the individual’s earnings and
“contributions,” even though these are designated as taxes.
Piketty’s exclusion of current and expected public pension plan benefits from his
data may be conventional and defensible, but it gives a terribly misleading picture of the
distribution of wealth. Apart from the value of expected benefits, there is the fact that, in
the absence of Social Security, many people would surely have saved more and
accumulated more wealth. In the absence of Social Security taxes, it would have been
easier to increase savings. To be fair, Piketty states, “it is quite difficult to say how
different wealth accumulation would have been in the twentieth century in the absence of
pay-as-you-go public pension systems” (p.392).23 But the amounts at stake are so
great—and the exclusion so dramatically darkens the picture of inequality—that the book
ought to come with a warning that “the dire story told herein excludes Social Security
benefits and other public pension plans even though these make a large percentage of the
bottom 75% much better off than they appear in these pages.”
Piketty further justifies the exclusion of “assets” such as Social Security benefits
by arguing that the expected benefits do not belong to the individual. They cannot be sold
or transferred. This distinction is weak. First, loans are available from private creditors
who take future benefits into account. The more certain these future payouts are, the
easier and cheaper the loans, though that is true for many assets. Indeed, we might think
of Social Security as a cousin of human capital. A lender can evaluate the likelihood that
a borrower will have a stream of income from either of these sources. Student loans are
an example of such lending; an entering law student can borrow more easily than can an
unemployed twenty-five year old. Lenders recognize the earning potential, or human
capital, of the student. Neither human capital (unless reified in intellectual property) nor
Social Security is available as collateral that can be repossessed, but the wealth
represented by these assets is recognized in the market.
The inclusion of human capital would not obviously alter the prediction of
growing inequality. It would probably flatten the picture at the top, as the top 20% would
close the gap with the top 1%, but the bottom 50% might look yet worse off. On the other

23

There is disagreement about the magnitude of the effect. See e.g., Martin Feldstein, Social Security and
Saving: New Time Series Evidence, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 151 (1996); William G. Gale, The Effect of Pensions
on Household Wealth: A Reevaluation of Theory and Evidence, 106 J. POL. ECON. 706 (1998); Jie Zhang &
Junsun Zhang, How Does Social Security Affect Economic Growth? Evidence from Cross-country Data, 17
J. POP. ECON. 473 (2004); Michael Hurd, et al., The Displacement Effect of Public Pensions on the
Accumulation of Financial Assets, 33 FISCAL STUD. 107 (2012).
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hand, the incorporation of public pension plan benefits would soften the entire picture,24
except for the observation that the United States is in the lead in growing inequality,
inasmuch as many European countries offer more generous retirement benefits. The
average Social Security benefit is about $15,000 per year.25 Roughly speaking, one who
expects that payout to begin in ten years and last for twenty years can think of herself as
having $115,000 in capital. Other reasonable assumptions would yield much larger
amounts. For millions of Americans, and their working-class counterparts in many other
countries, the promise of Social Security is likely to have an enormous impact on savings
behavior.
The best argument for excluding Social Security from the inequality calculations
is not that people are unable to trade or monetize their retirement benefits when they like,
but rather that unfunded or non-earmarked benefits are not, in principle, different from
other public services that are expected but not contractually guaranteed. For example,
national parks are also valuable assets.26 An individual might think of herself as owning a
share of national parks and look forward to visiting them when she retires. Indeed, if
these parks were privately owned, an individual might save more for retirement in order
to afford the entry fees that private owners would charge. If the capital represented by
these parks were divided among the population, the inequality picture would also look
rosier.
Despite the comparison, it is easy to distinguish Social Security from parks. The
former is an expectation about future disposable income, easily measured, while the latter
is of uncertain benefit to the future self. Our existing police forces, health care system,
and public transportation infrastructure might also cause one to save less; in their
absence, taxes would be lower and people would likely save more in order to purchase
private services in later years. These examples will seem different from Social Security
because they are further removed from disposable income; they concern “assets” not
normally included in wealth calculations because it is not obvious that most of us would
spend more on these services when old than when young. If Piketty were to include some
of these benefits from public goods, it is unclear whether the claim about increasing
inequality would change much, and whether the United States would look yet less
egalitarian than other countries. But it is almost certain that as the public sector has
grown, there are more assets that are shared in egalitarian fashion than there were during
the Gilded Age, the Belle Epoque, and other periods we are warned against re-creating.
Inequality may be growing, but once we take the value of public services into account,
not to mention the material goods now available at very low cost, it is plain that those in
24

See James Poterba et al., The Composition and Drawdown of Wealth in Retirement, 25 J. ECON. PERSP.
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the bottom half of the wealth distribution are in no danger of being returned to the world
their counterparts faced before the first or second World War.
A different perspective on this last point is to think about proportional and
progressive taxation. If the government provides for necessities such as health care, then
it is likely that the government must raise taxes to pay for those new benefits. If this tax is
proportional to income, then the net effect is likely to be quite progressive, inasmuch as
the good was previously purchased by individuals. At the individual level, privately
supplied health care surely occupies a larger fraction of a lower income person’s budget
than a higher income person’s budget. Its universal provision with a proportional tax is
therefore likely to be quite progressive in overall terms. In turn, unless the government is
largely funded through regressive taxes, a growth in the government sector at the expense
of the private market will almost always decrease inequality. Piketty’s enterprise largely
ignores this phenomenon.
IV. Taxing Towards Equality
Part Four of Capital in the Twenty-First Century advances the idea of a wealth tax
designed to undo the described growing inequality that is perhaps made inevitable by r >
g. Piketty illustrates the idea—or at least suggests how it might take hold—by imagining
a European tax of 0% on fortunes under 1 million euros, 1% annually on fortunes
between 1 and 5 million euros, and 2% (or much more) on larger amounts. He estimates
that this tax would affect 2.5% of the population and bring in revenues equal to 2% of
GDP (p. 528). He opines that the tax rate on fortunes above 100 million euros should be
above 2% and depend on observed returns, which he estimates at 6 or 7% (p. 529).27
Inasmuch as capital might quickly exit a jurisdiction enacting this sort of tax, Piketty
sketches out the tax as pan-European, and then global. He recognizes that the plan is
utopian (p. 515).28
But is it even that? It is difficult to evaluate a tax without knowing what it would
displace, or how its revenues would be spent. If it were to take the place of the property
27

In an interesting discussion of investment strategies and the rates of return available to very wealthy
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tax, for example, it would be important to specify the transition rules before evaluating
the impact of sudden, dramatic changes in property values. And if the revenues were used
for government spending or debt reduction, one needs to consider both the rent-seeking
that would take place and the likely winners and losers in the political process. For
example, if the revenues were earmarked for government health care costs, the inequality
trend would likely be reversed unless doctors and pharmaceutical companies managed to
acquire a great portion of the new expenditures. In any event, a global tax on capital is
interesting to contemplate and would almost surely yield a more egalitarian distribution
of wealth. It is also, however, impossible to imagine in the foreseeable future.
Considerations of a progressive and even global capital tax – with or without
human capital and pension plans in the tax base – and how its revenues should be spent
demonstrate the importance of politics in any discussions of inequality. There are several
reasons why our tax system is not more progressive, and these reasons are weighted
differently according to one’s political intuitions. Economists focus on incentives and the
tradeoff between work and leisure. As the marginal tax rate rises, people might choose to
work less. This is a distortion caused by the tax system, and in this case it translates into a
smaller pie for others. X benefits when Y works harder, both because of economic
growth and tax revenues from Y, and X loses these benefits when Y chooses more
leisure. There is also the fear that a high tax rate will drive Y and her work out of the
jurisdiction, though we can understand this to be part of a more comprehensive version of
the incentive problem. Despite these concerns, however, Piketty remains confident that a
wealth tax of several percent will not cause our pie to shrink (pp. 525-27).
But even a 1% tax on wealth could easily have unintended consequences with
respect to high earners’ incentives. Imagine that one who earns $1 million faces an
immediate and significant income tax of 33% and then a kind of double, or two-tier tax,
of another 1% in each subsequent year unless the money is consumed. Imagine further
that the individual is able to earn Piketty’s r of 6% each year. Over ten years the impact is
roughly equal to an additional 6% levy, or a 39% income tax in that first year. An annual
capital tax (on wealth, not merely on accretions to wealth) of 6%, added to prevailing
income taxes, would be devastating. Each year’s rate of return is subject to the 33%
income tax, leaving a 4% net return, which is less than the wealth tax. Slowly but surely
the two tiers of taxation would confiscate that original income, and surely discourage the
work required to earn it.
A subfield in the economics of public finance begins with the ingenious idea that
an “optimal tax” introduces no distortion at the margin and thereby suggests a tax of 0%
at the margin.29 Imagine that a law school graduate can expect to earn $100,000. Imagine
also an income tax rate of 10% on the first $17,400, 15% on the next $62,600, and 25%
on earnings above $70,700, for a total tax of $17,080. The average rate is about 17% and
the marginal rate is 25%. If offered a chance to work extra hours for more pay or
29

See J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971)
(showing that the optimal marginal rate on the highest earner is 0%).
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permitted to take a second job, this worker might decline since 25% of her new earnings
(not to mention other taxes) goes to the government. If the tax rate were higher, the
disinclination to work might be yet greater.
The optimal tax literature proposes a world in which this worker faces a tax of 0%
on additional income. To collect the same amount of revenue, she could instead be taxed
$17,080 on her human capital and its potential when she passes the bar; she then keeps
100% of all her earnings. Alternatively, she might be taxed at a 34% rate on the first
$50,000 of income and nothing thereafter, on the grounds that virtually every law
graduate can be expected to look hard for a job paying at least that amount.30 Piketty toys
with an optimal wealth tax along these lines and is well known for his work in the area
(p. 642-3 n.19).
A serious problem with this way of thinking is that it ignores political decisionmaking regarding the forces that determine tax rates and government spending.31 A full
discussion of the idea that follows would require some discussion of complexities
introduced by representative democracies and other realities, but a Book Review is a
place for suggestions rather than complete theorizing.
Consider a majoritarian system in which voters, or even the median voter,
determine government spending and tax policy. The median voter might be expected to
vote for higher taxes on the wealthiest one percent, or even twenty-five percent, because
this voter has absorbed the idea that she is unlikely to find herself in this group in the near
future. If productivity falls because the wealthiest groups are taxed too highly, then our
median voter might scale back her redistributive inclinations. With some mastery of the
optimal tax idea, the median voter – now or behind the veil of ignorance – might design a
system in which the marginal tax on wealth is very low; Piketty’s global capital tax may
be just the thing. But this raises another issue: the median voter will be tempted to raise
taxes and spend the revenue on projects that appeal to the median voter, regardless of its
efficiency. She expects to bear none of the costs associated with these projects, and so
she will support inefficient projects so long as they provide her with some benefit. The
median voter will surely favor proposals to redistribute away from the top one percent or
decile to the rest of the population but, setting redistribution plans aside, the danger is
that the low marginal tax rate causes bad decision-making about other government
projects.
This problem demonstrates that the optimal system is not simply an optimal tax
system, but an optimal fiscal system. Incentives need to be in place so that government
spending is on projects with a positive rate of return, even after redistribution decisions
30
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Holcombe, Tax Policy from a Public Choice Perspective, 51 Nat’l Tax J. 359 (1998).

18

have been made. It can be a disaster if the median voter faces a 0% marginal tax, because
this voter will want to approve new tax-and-spending programs with negative present
values. So long as there is some benefit to the median voter, she will be better off
externalizing costs on the wealthy taxpayers who bear positive marginal rates in order to
enjoy costless benefits herself. Most thinking about optimal taxation ignores the
incentives of voters, but an optimal fiscal approach should take into account not only
taxes and work effort but also taxes and spending.
The point is not that redistributive taxes are a bad idea. Rather, it is that they
ought to be structured so that, on the margin, voters do not face lower tax rates with
corresponding incentives to spend while others are being taxed. Redistributive taxes
probably should not draw from the margins, and the bulk of voters should face modest,
non-zero marginal taxes so they internalize both the costs and benefits of government
programs.
In short, a perspective that begins with the work-leisure tradeoff suggests the
advantages of low marginal rates, but the political decision-making perspective,
regarding taxing and spending, suggests more substantial marginal rates. One possibility
is for each voter, or at least those who might be swing voters, to face a marginal tax rate
equal to either the average tax rate or, more precisely, the median tax rate of the country
as a whole.32 Something of this kind represents the “optimal voter tax rate,” and it is
obviously much higher than zero. Piketty’s tax on capital falls short because it fails to
account for the inclination to overspend once there is a revenue source that comes from
the wealthiest taxpayers alone.
Conclusion
Piketty’s thesis about the root cause of increasing inequality is a conjecture, but a
tremendously important one. It has justifiably drawn notice from various quarters and put
Capital in the Twenty-First Century at every highly educated person’s bedside. If
evidence mounts in its favor, attention will turn to the question skirted in this Review—as
in the book itself—of exactly why we care about inequality. Severe inequality may be
politically dangerous, unseemly, or immoral, but it may also be energizing or episodically
inevitable. Picketty casts a dark shadow over the American political and economic
systems, but public pensions and other benefits that the middle class now enjoy brighten
the picture. Public services available to those near the bottom of the wealth distribution—
32

Imagine 10 citizen-voters with different levels of wealth. These voters consider building a bridge at a
cost of 100 with aggregate benefits of 80, and also consider a new sewer system at a cost of 100 and
aggregate benefit of 120. Setting many complexities aside, the median voter will internalize the costs and
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likely to be a typical user of the bridge as well as an average beneficiary of the new sewer system. The
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one-tenth of the cost of each project, and, more generally, the median voter should face a marginal rate
equal to the median average tax rate of the population. Optimal fiscal policy thus requires that we integrate
optimal tax theory, with its focus on the work-leisure tradeoff, and optimal political decision-making. That
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many of whom do not qualify for Social Security benefits—may be harder to value but
also should not be overlooked. In fact, the greatest change in the twentieth century,
insofar as inequality is concerned, was surely the dramatic growth of the public sector
worldwide, and it surely reduced inequality. Piketty’s data and approach obscure that
connection, but his recommendation for yet more government intervention should be
taken with caution. If inequality indeed worsens and the interventionist route is to be
taken, we will need to educate ourselves and our voters not only about the forces that
produce inequality, but also about the unintended consequences of redistributive
programs.
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